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The CIA War in Kurdistan: The Untold Story of the
Northern Front in the Iraq War. By Sam Faddis.
Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2020. ISBN 9781-61200-834-9. Photographs. Pp. xiii, 226. $34.95.
Over the past few decades, the story of the U.S.-Kurdish relationship in
northern Iraq has received little attention. In both the 1990s and early
2000s, the U.S. worked with the Kurds, promising them protection from
Saddam Hussein, weapons, and materiel support that never appeared.
Sam Faddis’ much-needed book fills a gap in this history that outlines the
outstanding initiative of field operatives juxtaposed against D.C.’s
bureaucratic inertia and tone deaf apparatchiks.
Faddis leaves the reader with a well-written tome that reads like a heartstopping thriller, but what he recounts actually occurred. Faddis is a
former U.S. Army combat arms officer and retired Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) officer with decades of undercover experience in the Middle
East and South Asia. He knows the area and its customs and cultures well.
Faddis recounts his first-hand experience as a CIA officer at CIA
Headquarters (HQ) in 2002 who volunteered to set up a base in northern
Iraq to work with Kurdish allies to prepare for the invasion of Iraq. Based
on his extensive experience in the area, he had the expertise and acumen
to operate in Iraqi Kurdistan.
As he built his team, he began to raise basic questions and practical
concerns about how to carry out his mission. His repeated queries about
how to get weapons and supplies to Kurds in northern Iraq through
Turkey were waived off by CIA bureaucrats and the White House. He
repeatedly highlights his frustration with the disconnects between
perceptions and the on-the-ground truth in northern Iraq. CIA HQ told
him to prepare pallets of supplies to take to the Kurds through Turkey.
Citing longstanding Turkish-Kurdish mutual loathing, Faddis pointed out
that Ankara would never permit this to take place. His chain of command
told him not to worry, that they would make it so. Time and again, Faddis
was correct, but his chain of command never seemed to be able to
acknowledge this.
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Arriving in northern Iraq after an arduous journey through Turkey marred
by bureaucratic roadblocks from both Ankara and Washington, Faddis and
his team established a presence and initiated liaison with leaders in the
various Kurdish factions. Kurdish leaders were suspicious of promises of
U.S. air support based on many years of hollow promises.
I was talking to a man who had lost countless members of his own
clan to the hands of Saddam. Kurdistan and its painful history were
his life. He wasn’t interested in what the National Security Council
was putting into PowerPoint presentations back home. He wanted
brass tacks and something tangible. Talking about commitment was
one thing; demonstrating commitment was another (54).
Faddis employed his tradecraft to demonstrate he was sincere and would
do what he could. He did promise that he was in country to help remove
Saddam Hussein and would not leave until that had occurred. Although
Kurdish allies were not entirely convinced, they agreed to work with the
CIA team. Faddis and his team began to operate in northern Iraq working
alongside their Kurdish allies. They had operational intelligence teams
collecting intelligence, running human sources, and sending hundreds of
intelligence reports back to CIA HQ. These reports outlined in detail Iraqi
capabilities, limitations, and opportunities the U.S. had in country to
undermine Saddam Hussein’s security apparatus.
Faddis repeatedly requested material support from CIA HQ to fulfill
Kurdish requests. Washington repeatedly ignored the reality that Ankara
had a de facto veto on anything passing from southeastern Turkey into
northern Iraq. In spite of this lack of support, Faddis and his team
continued intelligence collections and recruitments. Their
counterintelligence and counterterrorism reports filled an intelligence void
about ground truth in Iraqi Kurdistan. To Faddis’ amazement, none of this
intelligence seemed to have any impact on US. policy, and, to add insult to
injury, none of this intelligence got to U.S. military special forces, who
needed that situational awareness to effectively operate in denied territory.
As U.S. military special forces arrived in the area, Pentagon edicts,
bureaucratic snafus, and lack of understanding about local conditions led
the military leadership to downplay the necessity of effective liaison
relationships with the in-country CIA team that had been operating for
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months in a bare base environment. Some of Faddis’ frustration stemmed
from opposing viewpoints. Faddis viewed the Kurds as crucial allies in the
fight to overthrow Saddam Hussein. The military viewed the Kurds as a
force to be contained in order to avoid inflaming the passions of the Iraqi
people.
Despite a seemingly endless set of queries about Saddam Hussein’s WMD
capability, Faddis and his team never found any evidence that the Iraqi
dictator indeed had a WMD capability. CIA sources cited a WMD
capability as a reality, but never could provide the CIA with any concrete
evidence of the same. Washington bureaucrats never seemed to
acknowledge this fact.
Faddis expressed great frustration that despite the reliability of his team’s
sources on the ground, Washington bureaucrats placed great trust and
confidence in Iraqi exile Ahmed Chalabi, who had no access or credibility
within Iraq. Chalabi had influence in D.C. and with myriad lobbying
factions on K Street.
Chalabi was also a bald-faced liar when it came to intelligence. To
feather his own nest and to steer American policy over the years,
he had fabricated all kinds of information and passed it to a
succession of CIA officers. In response, the CIA had issued a “burn
notice” on him, which, before it became a cool name for a silly TV
show, meant that we had washed our hnads of him. We would not
meet him. We would not deal with him (150).
According to Faddis, Chalabi’s façade not only charmed, it influenced U.S.
policy in Iraq in spite of Chalabi’s lack of base or support. Chalabi did end
up as a media darling who received large sums of money due to his intense
lobbying efforts, while Faddis and his team left Iraq and went on to other
assignments. The quality and quantity of intelligence they produced was
successful beyond all expectations. Nonetheless, their efforts seem to have
been whitewashed away by events elsewhere in the country and the region.
Faddis’ account is a brutally honest account of austere field conditions,
D.C. bureaucratic fumbling, and an inability to keep faith with a constant
and loyal Kurdish ally. His book tells a story that, although unwelcome
and unflattering to the U.S., needs to be told.
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